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This essay attempts to understand János Kornai’s works from a political economy 
perspective. It argues that Kornai has significantly contributed to the formation of a new 
paradigm of political economy. The main endeavor of Kornai has been the combination of 
analytical concepts of economics with the empirical description of real economies. After a 
certain period of theoretical experimentation János Kornai formulated his research program 
that can be called the shortage economy explanation of the socialist system. The Economics 
of Shortage and The Socialist System have created a new theoretical paradigm in a framework 
in which it has become possible to establish a connection between the analytical and 
empirical, universal and historical aspects of the theory studying the socialist system as a real 
economic entity. János Kornai has built his analysis of the socialist system on the primary 
role of politics in the creation of economic institutions. In his present work on capitalism he 
has extended this thesis to the capitalist system. This seems to be an important contribution of 
his to a new political economy paradigm that is just in the process of formation. 
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1. Introduction: political economy versus economics 
 
Classical political economy, in the process of separating itself from philosophy, was built on 
the paradigm of the labor theory of value. The labor theory of value simultaneously served as 
an analytical economic theory, that is as an equilibrium theory (discussing the relationship of 
value and prices), as an empirical theory describing the structure of the real economy and 
deducing the existence of social classes having opposing interests and economic conflicts 
from the distribution of surplus value, and finally as a practical theory giving economic 
policy advice. The main policy proposition of classical political economy was to limit the 
economic intervention of the state according to the metaphor of the invisible hand. Classical 
political economy integrated analytic and empirical-historical thinking and on this basis made 
normative recommendations. Marx’s political economy radicalized further the idea of a 
unified theory. For Marx, political economy based on the labor theory of value became 
simultaneously the social theory of capitalism and the practical program of transcending 
capitalism. Marx believed that the economic and social system of capitalism and the logical 
structure of its historical transformation can be understood and expressed with the categories 
of political economy, that is with those of the labor theory of value. 
 However, in the second half of 19
th
 century a paradigm change occurred in economic 
theory: the labor theory of value was replaced by the subjective theory of value. As a 
consequence, political economy was transformed into economics. This metamorphosis 
separated the interlocking analytic, empirical and pragmatic elements of economic theory. 
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This separation was clearly described by Carl Menger, who was one of the leading 
representatives of the Copernican turn of economic theory. 
 Menger made a distinction among theoretical, empirical and pragmatic economic 
theory (Menger 1985: 38-39.). Theoretical economics discovers the general nature and the 
universal laws of economic phenomena. Economics as an exact science does not examine 
empirical facts and the relationship among empirical facts, therefore it ignores the empirical 
and historical aspects of the economy. 
 
The types and the typical relationships of economy may be of greater strictness or lesser, or in 
general of any nature - the nature of theoretical economics can under all circumstances consist 
in nothing else than in the exposition of just these types and typical relationships. In other 
words, it can consist only in the exposition of the general nature and the general connection of 
the laws of economic phenomena, but by no means, for instance, in the exposition of the 
nature and connection of individual phenomena of economy, i.e., in historical presentations, 
or else in practical rules for the economic activity of people. The theory of economy must in 
no case be confused with the historical sciences of the economy, or with the practical ones. 
(Menger 1985: 51)  
 
Theoretical economics is a science that is neither historical nor practical.
1
 Theoretical 
economics is an exact science because it does not generalize from empirical facts, but 
discovers the universal laws of the economy. It means that theoretical economics as a pure 
theory conceptualizes relationships that are ceteris paribus invariably valid. Theoretical 
economics as an analytical science formulates statements that are necessarily true and possess 
the „guarantee of absoluteness” (Menger 1985: 59). These statements cannot be empirically 
verified: “...the results of exact research, and indeed in all realms of the world of phenomena, 
are true only with certain presuppositions, with presuppositions which in reality do not always 
apply. Testing the exact theory of economy by the full empirical method is simply a 
methodological absurdity, a failure to recognize the basis and presuppositions of exact 
research” (Menger 1985: 69). 
 As opposed to theoretical economics empirical economics examines and describes the 
historical forms of the economy. If theoretical economics does not have a direct empirical 
subject, then there is a need for an empirical economics that deals with the totality of the real 
phenomena of human economy. This empirical economics examines economic relations 
existing in reality (Menger 1985: 72-73). Practical economics examines and describes the 
principles of economic policy making. Practical economics is a normative science (Menger 
1985: 39). 
 Menger argues that the mixing of the concepts and the levels of analysis of the three 
different economics is a theoretical mistake, and it is important to separate clearly these three 
sciences from one another. For empirical economics it means that a historical-empirical 
analysis may interpret historical-empirical economies applying the concepts of theoretical 
economics, but this interpretation is not going to be an analytical theory, but the non-
universal historical application of analytic concepts. It is an application that may examine the 
social and political aspects of economic action as an empirical and individual relationship, 
consequently this analysis cannot constitute a part of general economic theory, since the 
general theory may be general theory just because it assumes away the social and political 
aspects of economic actions. Modern economics may become an exact science only if it 
derives the social and political aspects of empirical reality from theory: economic theory 
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 “Theoretical economics can never be viewed as a historical science, nor, as many wish, as a practical one” 
(Menger 1985: 53). 
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cannot be political economy any more. However, it is important to keep in mind that Menger 
did not reduce general economic theory to general equilibrium theory, since he thought that it 
was possible to build an analytical theory of historical change. With this idea he expanded the 
framework of theoretical economics. 
 
Every theory, of whatever kind it may be and whatever degree of strictness of knowledge 
it may strive for, has primarily the task of teaching us to understand the concrete 
phenomena of the real world as exemplifications of a certain regularity in the succession 
of phenomena, i.e., genetically. Every theory, accordingly, strives first and foremost to 
make us understand the complicated phenomena of the research field peculiar to it as the 
result of the working of the factors responsible for its origin. This genetic element is 
inseparable from the idea of theoretical sciences (Menger 1985: 94). 
 
This way Menger founded the Austrian School of economics that later heavily criticized 
general equilibrium theory. 
 
2. The institutional turn of economics 
 
The enquiry of social and political aspects of economic activities formulated originally in the 
language of classical political economy was carried on not by economics, but by the new 
social sciences: sociology and political science. However, in the 20
th
 century there emerged 
new intellectual trends within economics that reclaimed the analysis of the social and political 
aspects of economic action for economic theory. The representatives of this new direction of 
research were not satisfied with the scientific program that separated the study of real 
economic processes from general theory. This new direction of research asked whether it was 
possible to create an analytical theory on its own right for the investigation of empirical 
economy? A theory that operates with analytical concepts but is different from general 
equilibrium theory. 
 Among the first to move toward the new theory was the Austrian School of 
Economics. Hayek stated that from the standpoint of general equilibrium theory it is 
impossible to compare the market economy and the centrally planned economy, because 
general equilibrium is unable to make a distinction between the two institutional forms of the 
economy.  
 
[F]rom the factually false hypothesis that the central planning board could command all the 
necessary information, it could logically follow that the problem was in principle soluble. 
To deduce from this observation the 'admission' that the real problem can be solved in 
theory is a rather scandalous misrepresentation. No-body can, of course, transfer to another 
all the knowledge he has, and certainly not the information he could discover only if market 
prices told him what was worth looking for” (Hayek 1982: 138). 
 
According to Hayek’s argument the centrally planned economy and the market economy can 
only be compared if one abandons the assumption of general equilibrium theory about 
perfectly informed economic actors. Making the assumption that these actors are imperfectly 
informed, opens up the opportunity to examine the question about the utilization of 
information and it becomes possible to discuss the problem of alternative utilization of 
information. Economic theory may now deal with the issue that economies with different 
institutional structure will discover the necessary information for economic decisions in 
different ways. This new research agenda makes the market economy and the centrally 
planned economy comparable (Hayek 1945: 519-530). 
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Later on, beside the Austrian school, new institutional economics and political 
economy were developed. All these disciplines study the institutional aspects of economic 
action without giving up their aspiration for an analytical theory. This research perspective is 
embraced by János Kornai in his work. 
 
3. In search of a new paradigm: Anti-equilibrium 
 
János Kornai has created the new political economy of the socialist system. Kornai’s theory 
of socialism is not an application of general equilibrium theory on empirical issues, but it is 
the formulation of a new paradigm of economic theory. What is more, János Kornai has 
created this new paradigm by working on a new subject, on the socialist economy. The theory 
on the socialist system has integrated the discourse on the socialist economy in a new, 
innovative way. Kornai has simultaneously renewed the theory and the empirical findings of 
this discourse. This is the reason why János Kornai has become the internationally best 
known and recognized Hungarian economist. The new theory can be found in the pioneering 
book of The Economics of Shortage and in The Socialist System that contains a theoretical 
synthesis of the subject. These books did not come into existence like Pallas Athena who 
leaped out of Zeus’s head, fully grown and armed. To the contrary, these texts were the fruits 
of a stout and long lasting work, the products of theoretical experimentations. 
János Kornai’s PhD dissertation, Overcentralization in Economic Administration took 
the first steps toward the direction of a new theory by choosing to examine the real 
functioning of the system of central planning instead of remaining at an improductive 
exercise in the normative and ideological theory of planning. In this book the author’s 
argumentations rooted in empirical investigations about the internal conflicts and bargaining 
processes of central planning already appeared. This early analysis was later utilized in the 
category and analysis of vertical bargaining in the socialist economy. 
János Kornai’s first attempt at the synthesis of theoretical and empirical research was 
his Anti-equilibrium. The author himself wrote about it in his autobiography: “Anti-
Equilibrium is not merely an item on my list of publications. It was the most ambitious 
enterprise of my career as a researcher” (Kornai 2006: 197). 
Kornai was not satisfied with the exactness and logical purity of general equilibrium 
theory. In Anti-equilibrium he tried to change this theory. His goal was to transform general 
equilibrium theory in order to make it capable to describe and analyze real economies. Anti-
equilibrium was an attempt at bringing together analytical theory with the theory of real 
economies, an attempt at enriching general economic theory with the theory of social 
institutions. According to his theoretical program the former should be corrected by the latter. 
Anti-equilibrium contains numerous important and path-breaking ideas that return in 
Kornai’s subsequent writings, but the theory upon which the criticism of general equilibrium 
theory was based in this book proved to be unsuccessful even by the later evaluation of the 
author himself. The paradigm of general equilibrium theory resisted Kornai’s criticism, since 
this theory is tied to those presuppositions that make it invariably valid – as we could learn it 
from Menger. These presuppositions of general equilibrium theory do not allow the 
incorporation those concepts which would be necessary to thematize the functioning of the 
real economy. In other words, general equilibrium theory assumes away those institutional 
configurations of the real economy that determine the functioning of the real economy and for 
this reason the study of the real economy cannot be incorporated into it. That is the reason 
why Anti-equilibrium turned out to be problematic: this book was controversial not for the 
answers it gave but for the questions it asked. János Kornai drew this conclusion: the errors 
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should be found not in general equilibrium theory, but in the way of its application to the real 
economy. “I should have attacked not the purity of the theory (the abstract, unreal nature of its 
assumptions), but the wrong use of it in mainstream economics. The real addressee of the 
critique should have been mainstream teaching practices and research programs” (Kornai 
2006: 184-185). 
Still, the theoretical experimentations of Anti-equilibrium proved to be valuable for 
the author whose research program was to establish the theory of the real economy in a new 
way. The new research question formulated by Kornai was not how to integrate the analysis 
of the real economy into general equilibrium theory, but how to create the theory of the real 
economy on its own. In formulating this new question, János Kornai could rely on an 
important critical thesis worked out in Anti-equilibrium. In this book the author made the 
argument that general equilibrium theory is unable to explain the differences of the existing 
economic systems, because from the perspective of equilibrium theory equilibrium can be 
achieved both in a market economy and a centrally planned economy. 
Kornai writes in By Force of Thought:  
 
Equilibrium is reached by both systems so long as certain rules are adhered to. Indeed, under 
a given optimum criterion and other conditions, both systems may arrive at an optimal state. 
[...] The similarity perplexed me. Was it then immaterial whether we lived in a centralized or 
a decentralized economy, under capitalism or communism? Or had the perplexing similarity 
arisen because both models overlooked the very attributes of real, living economic systems to 
explain the difference between actual capitalism and actual socialism—a living market 
economy and a living command economy? (Kornai 2006: 181). 
 
This theoretical finding connects Kornai to the thinkers of the Austrian School, especially, as 
we saw, to Hayek.
2
 However, Kornai does not simply remain within the confines of the 
Austrian theory but as we will see he also moves beyond it toward a more specific 
institutional analysis. 
The conclusion can be drawn that Anti-equilibrium significantly contributed to 
Kornai’s later theoretical synthesis about the socialist system – just because he was capable of 
critical self-reflection. Building on the lessons of Anti-equilibrium János Kornai could utilize 
his former efforts to find a new theoretical synthesis for the theory of the socialist system. The 
new synthesis could rely on the contrast worked out in Anti-equilibrium between surplus 
economy (pressure) and shortage economy (suction), between buyers’ and sellers’ market 
regimes. The novelty of Economics of Shortage and The Socialist System lies in the 
theoretical construction of the interrelationships between the shortage economy, the socialist 
system and the surplus economy, the capitalist system. 
 
4. The formation of the political economy of the socialist system 
 
The shortage economy explanation of the socialist system is a new theoretical paradigm. This 
theory assumes an internal relationship between the shortage economy and the socialist 
system. It was a common experience for those who lived in socialism that shortage 
phenomena proliferate in the socialist economy,
3
 but this experience was first transformed 
                                                          
2
 The relationship between Kornai and the Austrian school is discussed by Leeson (2008). Leeson shows how 
similar the ideas of the scholars of the Austrian School and those of Kornai are, to what extent these ideas 
overlap, but he does not deal with the theoretical differences of these ideas. 
3
 Let me invoke a joke from the era of socialism. Radio Yerevan is asked whether it is possible to create a 
shortage of sand in the Sahara. The answer is yes, if the socialist system is introduced in the Sahara. 
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into a comprehensive theory by Kornai. The author of Economics of Shortage and The 
Socialist System made the hypothesis that every shortage economy is a socialist economy and 
every socialist economy is a shortage economy. Consequently, the relationship between 
socialist institutions and the shortage economy is not incidental and extrinsic, to the contrary, 
this relationship is essential and intrinsic. The research task is to reveal the nature of this 
relationship. 
In the process of confirmation of his hypothesis János Kornai explained how the 
political and economic institutions of the socialist system beget the shortage economy and its 
behavioral regularities. In this explanation the concept of soft budget constraint played a key 
role. Kornai invented and introduced this concept into the literature of economics.
4
 The 
category of soft budget constraint mediates between the analytical-deductive and historical-
institutional argumentations of the theory due to its dual characteristics. The concept of 
budget constraint originates from microeconomics, but Kornai’s idea that the budget 
constraint of an economic agent may be soft assigns an additional institutionally grounded 
meaning to this term. The concept of soft budget constraint refers to a specific historical-
institutional nexus and goes beyond the world of standard microeconomics. The softness of 
the budget constraint of socialist enterprises is derived from the institutions of bureaucratic 
coordination and state ownership. Consequently, through the concept of soft budget 
constraint it becomes possible to establish a connection between the analytic and empirical, 
universal and historical aspects of the socialist system as a real economic entity within the 
framework of the shortage economy explanation. 
The theory derives the shortage economy syndrome, the behavioral regularities of the 
economic actors in a shortage economy from the institutional structure of the socialist 
economy. This is an important theoretical innovation that also goes beyond the achievements 
of the Austrian School. In accordance with the theory of the Austrian School the shortage 
economy paradigm of socialism also emphasizes that in order to be able to understand the 
capitalist and the socialist system, general equilibrium theory has to be transcended. Kornai’s 
theory also builds on the thesis that on the one hand private ownership and market (market 
coordination in Kornai’s terms), on the other hand state ownership and central planning 
(bureaucratic coordination) belong to each other, there is an affinity between them (Kornai 
1990; Kornai 1992: 447-450, 497-500). At the same time Kornai enriches the analysis of this 
relationship mainly by the utilization of the results of the property rights school and by 
demonstrating that the regularities of economic behavior induced by state ownership and 
bureaucratic coordination can be understood only if the theory of these institutions is linked 
to the concept of soft budget constraint and the issues of the shortage economy. 
The shortage economy theory of socialism has understandably provoked a lot of 
responses within the circles of economists.
5
 However, it is important to mention that Kornai’s 
theory has had not only theoretical but significant practical effects. The Economics of 
Shortage was read and understood not only by economists, but also by other social scientists 
and even by the wider and lay public.
6
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 At present the category of soft budget constraint enjoys such a widespread acceptance in the scientific 
community that it is treated now as common property and those who apply it often do not refer to its original 
author. 
5
 Let me just remark that the impact of this theory has extended to the other social sciences as well. The 
international reception of Economics of Shortage is presented and analyzed by Hámori (2012). 
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 Balázs Hámori remarks that the Economics of Shortage was published in 3000 copies in Hungary in 1980 and 
it immediately sold out: a shortage of Economics of Shortage was created (Hámori 2012: 387.).  
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János Kornai did not commit himself to direct political activities, protests against the 
socialist regime because he decided to work out his theory in Hungary (Kornai 2006: 132-
134). Still, the theory of the shortage economy did also have a political influence. In the 
socialist system social science publications could attract an attention of political and 
ideological nature even if they did not want to create a direct political effect. The public who 
read these works was mainly made of lay intellectuals with critical attitudes toward the 
existing system. The subject matter of Economics of Shortage was the socialist system and 
this subject was not an esoteric topic for a narrow scientific community but an existential 
problem for ordinary people. The Economics of Shortage destroyed the belief in the 
superiority of the socialist system and demonstrated that it cannot be reformed. The 
separation of the theory of socialist system from reform economics had an intellectually 
liberating power. The book sent the message that the theses about the political sacredness of 
the one-party system and state ownership do not have to be approved by the theory. These 
theses could not be contested by the reform economist, since he or she was striving for 
practical and not for theoretical success. It was the condition of the political success of 
economic reforms that the advocates of reforms did not challenge the basic institutions of the 
socialist system. The shortage economy theory of socialism did just that, it challenged and 
removed the ideological underpinnings of the socialist system and for this reason it played an 
important role in the intellectual preparation for the collapse of the socialist system, by 
destroying the identity of the socialist system.
7
 
 
5. A new paradigm of political economy 
 
The socialist system collapsed by the 1990s. How does it affect the researcher who has lost 
the most important subject matter of his research? Can the theory of shortage economy retain 
at least some of its theoretical importance? I think it can. In the last 20 years János Kornai’s 
writings demonstrated why the theory of shortage economy stayed with us. First, the theory 
can be applied to the analysis of the postsocialist transformation, due to the effects of the 
socialist past on the transformation process – this is the effect linked to the path-dependence 
of social change. Second, the category of soft budget constraint is a useful analytical tool not 
just for the study of the socialist, but also of the capitalist system, because there exist actors 
with soft budget constraint also in a capitalist system. One should just think of the health care 
sector.
8
 Third, and it seems to be the most important point, the collapse of the socialist system 
has not invalidated the theory describing the socialist system with the interrelated concepts of 
shortage and surplus economy. This set of concepts may also be utilized in the theory of 
capitalist system: the understanding of capitalism requires that it be regarded as a surplus 
economy (Kornai 2011). With this research program János Kornai is contributing to the 
development of a new paradigm of political economy. 
 In explaining economic behavior the new political economy relies on the analytic 
concepts of economics that are connected to an institutional analysis. Consequently, the 
empirical application of the analytical theory is also a process of theorizing. North states this 
rather clearly: “[…] in a zero transaction cost world, increases in the stock of knowledge and 
its application (both physical and human capital) provide a key to the potential well-being of 
human beings in societies. What was left out of the analysis was why the potential was not 
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 “[…] Economics of Shortage played a uniquely important role in the intellectual preparation of the systemic 
change – it happens only on very rare occasions that a professional work can be so unambiguously connected to 
an important historical turning point of systemic change.” (Chikán 2004: 698). See also Hámori (2012: 393). 
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 See Kornai (1998) and Kornai – Eggleston (2001). 
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realized, and why there is such an enormous gap between the rich countries and the poor 
countries when the technology is, for the most part, available to everyone” (North 1990: 133). 
In other words: if the theory is unable to thematize the impact of institutions on the actions of 
economic actors, it will not be able to explain how economic systems function in practice. 
The representatives of new political economy argue that the behavior of economic actors is 
determined by economic institutions, but economic institutions can and should be understood 
from political institutions (North – Wallis – Weingast 2009; Acemoglu – Robinson 2012). 
 
This important finding was already the corner stone of Kornai’s theory of shortage. While the 
word ‘party’ did not appear in Economics of Shortage, the substantive discussion in the The 
Socialist System began with analysis of the party’s role, political power and ideology. The 
book stated what I had been unable to express 12 years earlier: the origin and operation of the 
socialist system can only be understood truly by starting from the role of political power and 
official ideology (Kornai 2012: 367). 
 
With the extension of his theory on the capitalist system Kornai also performs the 
generalization of the thesis that the political system determines the economic system. 
 
 
 
Figure1. Models of the Socialist and the Capitalist Systems 
Source: Kornai (2000: 29). 
 
From the analysis based on the contrast and comparison of the socialist and the capitalist 
system follows the general thesis that political institutions play a determining role in the 
formation of economic institutions. This theory seems to be rather close to that of Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2006; 2012). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Institutions and economic performance 
Source: Acemoglu-Robinson (2006: 677). 
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Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson argue that there exists an intrinsic connection between 
political and economic institutions and this connection is of hierarchical nature: the causal 
direction starts from the polity and goes toward the economy.  
 
[P]olitical institutions determine the distribution of de jure political power, which in turn 
affects the choice of economic institutions. This framework therefore introduces a natural 
concept of a hierarchy of institutions, with political institutions influencing equilibrium 
economic institutions, which then determine economic outcomes (Acemoglu – Johnson – 
Robinson 2004: 5).
9
 
 
North and his co-authors also draw attention to the importance of the internal relationships 
between the economic and the political system. “The seeming independence of the economic 
and political systems on the surface is apparent, not real. In fact, these systems are deeply 
intertwined” (North – Wallis – Weingast 2009: 269). In their previous study they made an 
even stronger statement:  
 
Sustaining social order requires the development of a state organization capable of limiting 
violence, and that requires that political and economic systems work in concert. The 
fundamental contribution of our approach is integrating a theory of economic behavior with a 
theory of political behavior by demonstrating how political systems manipulate the economy 
in order to sustain political stability, limit violence, and provide social order (North – Wallis 
– Weingast 2006: 4). 
 
Kornai’s argument about the interrelationship of the polity and the economy is not just similar 
but is also different from the statements of Acemoglu and Robinson and North et al. Kornai 
extends the thesis about the primary role of politics in the creation of economic institutions in 
the socialist system to the capitalist system. North et al. and Acemoglu and Robinson 
generalize this thesis from the comparison of capitalist and non-capitalist (mainly 
precapitalist) systems and apply it to the socialist system. At the same time Kornai also 
emphasizes those correspondences between the political and the economic system of society 
that maintain the coherence of society. Both in the capitalist and the socialist system the 
institutionalization of the polity serves as the political safeguard of the economic system and 
as a basic condition that informs the institutional patterns of the economy. 
North et al. also emphasize the importance of the correspondence between the 
intrinsic structures of the political and the economic system. They call it the theory of double 
balance. Double balance is  
 
a correspondence between the distribution and organization of violence potential and 
political power on the one hand, and the distribution and organization of economic power 
on the other hand. The idea of the double balance suggests not only that all of the social 
systems in a society must have an internal balance of interests but also that the political, 
economic, cultural, social, and military systems must contain compatible systems of 
incentives across the systems if a society is to remain stable (North – Wallis – Weingast 
2009: 20). 
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 See also: “Each society functions with a set of economic and political rules created and enforced by the state 
and the citizens collectively. Economic institutions shape economic incentives: the incentives to become 
educated, to save and invest, to innovate and adopt new technologies, and so on. It is the political process that 
determines what economic institutions people live under, and it is the political institutions that determine how 
this process works” (Acemoglu – Robinson 2012: 46-47). 
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Acemoglu and Robinson also underline that there is an intrinsic relationship between the 
institutional configurations of the polity and the economy: extractive political institutions 
build up a coherent whole with extractive economic institutions, while inclusive political 
institutions generate and maintain inclusive economic institutions (Acemoglu – Robinson 
2012: 76-77). 
It seems that Kornai’s present work is in line with that of other authors who are 
building a new paradigm of political economy. This is a new frontier of research and Kornai’s 
work can be seen as an important contribution to this new paradigm. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The understanding of the patterns of functioning of the socialist and the capitalist system, the 
description of these systems within a theoretical framework that combines analytical and 
empirical, theoretical and historical aspects of explanation played a central role in the oeuvre 
of János Kornai. This work required simultaneously the careful collection of tiny details and 
an understanding of the big picture made out of those tiny elements. This task – beyond the 
necessary mental capabilities – also demanded from the researcher self-discipline, 
humbleness toward the subject of inquiry, and an immense amount of work. I wonder what 
inspired the author to make all these painstaking efforts. Was it curiosity? Was it the 
intellectual excitement of discovering new theories? Or the joy to solve puzzles? All this 
must have been important, but there was also something else, and it was the wish to change 
the existing social practice. János Kornai cultivates science also as a means for the goal of 
practical change. For him exact scientific analysis is important also because it may assist in 
the choice among practical alternatives of action. For János Kornai science serves important 
human, and even political values. The internal theoretical-logical coherence of his works 
serves the coherence of the thinking and acting man. How did Goethe ask in the novel Lotte 
in Weimar? “[…] is work the objectification of conscience […]?” (Mann 1977: 283). The 
oeuvre of János Kornai answers this question in the affirmative. 
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